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Abstract—This paper introduces security assessment 
methodology for isolated single-workstation multilayer systems 
processing sensitive or classified data according with  
a corresponding security model for such system. The document 
provides a high-level tool for systematizing certain-class-systems 
security models development. The models based on the 
introduced methodology cover data confidentiality and 
availability attributes protection on a sufficient level. 
 
Keywords—cybersecurity, security assessment methodology, 
security model, Graham-Denning model, Bell-La Padula model, 
Clark-Wilson model 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HIS paper introduces security assessment methodology for 
isolated single-workstation multi-layer systems processing 
sensitive or classified data according with  
a corresponding security model for a representative computer 
system. The document provides a high-level tool for 
systematizing certain-class-systems security models 
development. The methodology is an adaptation of the general 
procedure for building classified IT systems described in legal 
documents (i.e. in Poland: [1],[18]) and standards (i.e. [13]).  
The main security attribute protected in systems modelled 
using introduced algorithm is confidentiality of data processed 
in the system. Nonetheless, availability (on a sufficient level) 
and integrity (on a basic level) of the data is also regarded in 
the models. In the methodology, as a basis for considerations 
Graham-Denning [11], Bell-La Padula [4],[5] and Clark-
Wilson [8] models were adopted. In the course of the article 
the alternative approaches are mentioned. 
The main issues presented in the methodology are:  
• Idea of abstract system entities – system layers, being the 
structures containing set of objects and linked entities 
collections. The layer-driven attitude towards the modelled 
systems definitions is shown in the methodology to prove the 
layers utility and facility.   
• Description of security level determination recursive method 
based on probability of beating penetration path, being a set 
of activities that adversary must perform in order to penetrate 
the layer in an unauthorized manner. 
• Concept of describing dynamics of the modelled systems via 
state graph definition – based on layers conception mixed 
with Clark-Wilson [8] model axioms utilization. 
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II. CONSIDERED SYSTEMS CLASS 
Systems class considered in the paper is defined by the 
following statements and conditions: 
• Sensitive or classified data, protected in the system is in the 
form of files. 
• The purpose of the system remains undefined. 
• Types, formats nor content of the files are relevant – in order 
to increase the level of generality (hence – level of adequacy 
to the reality, regardless of the purpose of the system). 
• System consists of a single workstation (in general it is not 
relevant as, in case of system consisting of more than one 
workstation, every workstation inherits the security scheme). 
• User environments are set as virtual machines in a host 
operating system. The virtual machines are visible as file 
system items. 
• At least two independent security layers are implemented in 
the system (defense-in-depth rule). 
• Cryptographic protection mechanisms are used. 
• Access to objects without proper access rights is prohibited 
in the system. 
• Subjects allowed to access objects in “lower” system layers 
must be provided access to all the layers in between 
(“higher” layers). 
• The system is isolated from external IT networks and 
devices. 
• Data exchange is executed by recording data on removable 
media, only by authorized subjects. 
• It is forbidden to update system hardware or software 
configuration – except for emergencies or software errors. 
III. SECURITY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
Considerations included in this Section describe the global 
system definition. The definition contains static system issues, 
independent on the system’s current state. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to define each of the model elements described 
below to enable the possibility of system’s dynamics 
considerations. 
A. Security system and acceptable security level definition 
Security system definition is a high-level perspective of 
security policies. Formally, it is represented as a tuple of 
defined system elements, and rules in the system as well as the 
conditions under which the system may be considered secure.  
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One of the mandatory conditions to be stated in the definition 
is the acceptable security level. It is a value or set of values 
representing the acceptable probability of beating penetration 
paths. Despite of the fact that the probability of beating “the 
deepest” layer is the most crucial value in the acceptable 
security level, it is recommended to define probability values 
for each of the defined penetration paths. 
B. Classes, categories and sensitivity levels structure 
definition 
Class is a legally required (data clause / security clearance) 
or subjective label representing security measures needed to be 
implemented when it comes to particular entity. It is required 
to define a linear order relation on the classes set. The defined 
labels structure is considered an organizational data 
availability limitations mechanism. 
Category is a label informing about data domain or insight 
privileges. The set of categories is defined in order to restrict 
access to data according to the principle of least privilege. In 
multi-domain data processing systems it is recommended to 
implement a tree structure defining parent-child domains 
relationship. 
Sensitivity level structure is a generic data structure binding 
classes and categories. The structure’s elements should 
uniquely define privileges needed to access to the entity of  
a certain domain – category. It is required to define an order 
relation on the sensitivity level structure, similarly to [4]-[6]. 
C. Subjects, objects and layers definition 
Objects are entities used, stored or processed in the system. It 
is recommended to define only objects essential for system to 
work according to its purpose to lower the model’s 
complexity.  
Objects are not granted organizational access rights in the 
model. The organizational rights are not identical with 
technical access rights (such as file system accessibility in 
operating system). 
Layers are abstract entities grouping set of objects and 
vulnerabilities, threats and security measures associated with 
the objects. The purpose of layers in the model are to 
emphasize and include multi-layer system structure in 
mathematical considerations, providing higher adequacy to the 
reality. Similarly to objects, layers are not granted 
organizational access rights in the model.  
Layers definition, separate from objects definition, leads to 
facilitation of the model. From the practical point of view, the 
defined layers may also be considered objects. However, due 
to inconsistencies in “layer” objects and “casual” objects 
definitions it is easier to create another structure – similar to 
equivalence class with a relation of sharing same threats being 
applicable the same security measures. 
Subjects are entities identical to roles implemented in the 
system (they are not identical to the people working in the 
system). It is not forbidden to assign multiple roles to a single 
person, however, it is recommended to follow the principle of 
least privilege. 
Subjects’ organizational rights imply the need of technical 
access rights implementation on modelled objects and layers in 
the system. The technical access rights may be considered 
security measures in a model. 
D. Objects to layers assignment 
Each object must be assigned to a layer. The assignment is 
the projection of a modelled entities’ dependencies in  
a modelled system. It is not possible to assign an object to 
multiple layers. Depending on the system’s configuration, it is 
allowed to store copies of object in distinct layers, however, 
the case is not considered in the paper. 
E. Sensitivity levels to subjects and objects assignment  
It is recommended to follow assignments defined in [5]: 
• Each object is assigned to a single sensitivity level, which 
determines subject’s sensitivity level required to gain access 
to the object. 
• Each subject is assigned two sensitivity levels: 
o Current sensitivity level, which determines permissions to 
objects in current subject’s work session. 
o Authorize level, which determines maximum current 
sensitivity level subject can be assigned. 
• Each layer is implicitly assigned a sensitivity level, equal to 
the greatest from sensitivity levels of the objects within the 
layer. 
F. Access rights structure definition 
It is recommended to define subjects’ access rights to objects 
and layers exclusively. Based on the definition it is possible to 
restrict access to particular objects in a layer and allow users to 
access the object in a “lower” layer without granting privileges 
to objects in transitional layers. The access rights structure 
must be dependent on the purpose and configuration of the 
system. 
There are many approaches towards access rights’ structure 
definition. The most common are: 
• Matrix structure – as introduced in i.e. [5],[6],[11]. 
• Access Control List structure – as introduced in i.e. [3]. 
• Role-Based Access structure – as introduced in i.e. [3],[14]. 
• Lattice structure – as introduced in i.e. [9],[19]. 
G. Integrity verification and transformation procedures 
definition 
It is recommended to follow the certification and 
enforcement rules defined in [8]. Furthermore, it is mandatory 
to define integrity policy in the system, which, in particular, 
implies the way users actions are logged in the system. [20] 
It is advised that the integrity verification and transformation 
procedures are assigned to the particular layers. The 
assignment prevents from organizational system deadlocks, as 
each one of the layers may require unique internal procedures, 
unable to execute in a different layer. 
As the alternative approach, it is possible to use integrity 
policies described in Biba integrity model. [6] However, the 
integrity axioms introduced by Biba juxtaposed with 
confidentiality axioms from [5] may lead to contradiction in 
most of the modelled systems. 
H. Vulnerabilities identification and threats structure 
definition 
It is recommended to identify system’s vulnerabilities based 
on a state graph. [20] This approach provides clear view on 
dynamic changes in the system. The defined vulnerabilities 
imply threats definitions (threats are considered practical ways 
of exploiting identified vulnerabilities). The state graph may be 
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considered a mathematical way of applying the approach 
introduced in i.e. [16] 
It is required that defined threats structure contains 
probability values of a threat execution in a layer or in 
reference to a subject. Threat execution probability for  
a given layer is applicable for every object within the layer. 
For certain systems of the considered class it may be necessary 
to additionally define another threats structure - probability 
values of threats execution in reference to system objects, and 
bind it with the required structure. 
An alternative approach towards vulnerabilities identification 
is based on the game theory. The approach has been introduced 
in, i.e. [2],[7],[15],[17]. The approach may be considered 
complementary for systems with more complicated data flow 
implemented. 
I. Security measures for identified threats identification and 
security measures structure definition 
It is recommended to create security measures structure 
definition identical with threats structure definition. This 
approach results in a convenient merge of the structures, which 
is mandatory to compute the model output.  
It is required to check whether implemented security 
measures do not expose the system to new vulnerabilities. If 
any new vulnerability is identified, it is necessary to apply 
another security measures or reconsider existing ones. 
J. Penetration paths definition 
Penetration path is a set of activities that adversary must 
perform in order to penetrate the layer in an unauthorized 
manner. The approach adopted in the paper is that each layer 
has a single penetration path associated – the penetration path 
is a set of the most probable malicious activities, dynamically 
changing depending on implemented security measures. 
Therefore, it is recommended to associate penetration paths 
with a distinct layers and recursively bind penetration paths 
associated with following layers, so that 
• defense-in-depth rule is modelled in a way adequate to the 
reality,  
• it is possible to easily identify layers in need for security 
improvements. 
K. Output computation 
The output is computed using the defined penetration paths, 
given the conditions stated in security system definition. If the 
output values are greater than defined in acceptable security 
level it is mandatory to repeat security measures identification. 
IV. SYSTEM DYNAMICS CONSIDERATIONS 
As mentioned in Sec. III, the described methodology focuses 
on system issues independent on system’s current state. 
However, as mentioned in Sec. III.G and III.H, it is 
recommended to consider the system dynamics to define and 
identify integrity policy and vulnerabilities. 
The below considerations show one of the possible 
approaches towards describing the modelled system’s 
dynamics. 
A. Active sub-model 
Active sub-model is a section of a defined model associated 
with the possible states that a subject currently working can 
reach during its current work session. In a single session the 
subject must be assigned the current sensitivity level – not 
greater than its authorization level. The objects’ set must be 
limited to the elements not greater than subject’s current 
sensitivity level, which implies that the layers and layer-
associated structures contents must be limited respectively. 
It is required that neither of layers, integrity verification 
procedures, transformation procedures nor penetration paths 
structures have been changed in the sub-model definition, 
according to the global model. Moreover, it is prohibited to 
change any of the model’s elements structure during being 
used in an active system session. 
Given the above considerations, the sub-model consists of 
the following elements and structures: 
• Subject currently working in the system with a current 
sensitivity level assigned. 
• Subset of objects set limited to the ones the subject may have 
access to during the current system session. 
• Substructure of access rights connected with the subject and 
the subset of active objects. 
• Unchanged set of layers. The contents of layers may be 
altered, but it forbidden to remove any of the layers from the 
origin set. 
• Substructure of threats and security measures connected with 
the subset of objects (if existing). The structure of threats and 
security measures connected with defined layers must remain 
unchanged. 
• Unchanged structure of integrity verification and 
transformation procedures. 
• Unchanged set of penetration paths. 
B. State graph 
State graph consists of nodes defined as a tuple of the 
following elements: 
• Subject currently working in the system. 
• Layer the object is currently working in. 
• Subset of the active objects set adherent to the current layer. 
• Substructure of the subject’s current access rights tied with 
the layer and subset of the active objects. 
• Substructure of threats bound with the current layer. 
• Substructure of security measures bound with the current 
layer. 
• Substructure of integrity verification procedures connected 
with the subset of the active objects and the current layer.   
• Substructure of transformation procedures connected with 
the subset of the active objects and the current layer the 
subject has access rights to execute. 
Current state change is possible only via executing the valid 
transformation procedure and after the state verification via 
integrity validation procedures. Due to the above, it is 
necessary that the state graph is a directed graph. The edges of 
the graph should be labeled with the subsets of procedures 
required to be executed in order to change the system state. 
C. Vulnerabilities identification based on a state graph 
Having defined the system’s state graph it is convenient to 
identify vulnerabilities for each state. The identification is 
based on negating the states restrictions and checking whether 




below scenarios in the system would be considered  
a vulnerability: 
• Subject change during an active system session. 
• More than a single subject during an active system session. 
• The valid subject’s current sensitivity level change.  
• Active objects set modification without proper access rights. 
• Layers set modification. 
• Integrity verification procedures subset modification.  
• Transformation procedures subset modification. 
D. Integrity policy definition based on a state graph 
As mentioned in Sec. IV.B, the system state change is 
dependent on predefined procedures. The procedures must 
maintain and validate the system’s integrity. However, the 
above approach is not strong enough to secure data integrity. 
Suppose an adversary reaches a state in a state graph. The 
adversary exploits the state’s integrity by bypassing or 
disabling procedures required to change the system state to any 
of the child states. If the adversary exploits data or layer 
integrity, there is a great possibility that all the data in “lower” 
system layers becomes corrupted or destroyed. 
The mentioned situation implies that integrity protection in 
multi-layer systems must be strictly policed or inversely 
defined to implement sufficient security measures. Based on an 
inverse definition, a separate model is formed, therefore, in 
order to utilize the model corresponding to the described 
methodology it is necessary to thoroughly define the integrity 
policy. 
It is strongly recommended to implement cryptography-
based verification procedures in addition to access control 
mechanisms preventing from harmful and malicious data 
modification. Moreover, as the most complicated issue in 
systems of the considered class, it is necessary to implement  
a system event log. The below mechanisms may be 
considered: 
• Local event log  
Saving logs within the closed environment and retrieving 
them periodically as the administrator’s integrity 
maintenance procedure. The logs container should be placed 
in “the highest” layer to ensure logs availability. The 
proposition is inconsistent with confidentiality axioms [5]. 
• Remote logging environment 
The proposition requires implementing internal secure 
network, therefore remains inconsistent with the systems 
class assumptions. 
• No logging in “lower” layers 
The proposition could be valid only if non-administrator 
users were not able to produce any materials in the system. 
Then the users environments should be destroyed without 
unsealing them at any time. This logging policy requires 
significantly greater availability protection mechanisms. 
As shown above, the proposed solutions are vulnerable to 
many exploits – therefore insufficient to ensure data integrity 
protection singlehandedly. 
V. SECURITY MODEL OF THE DEFINED SYSTEMS CLASS 
REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM 
The model defined in this Section is compatible with the 
methodology described in Sec. III. The model is based on 
[4],[5],[8],[11],[20]. 
A. Security system and acceptable security level definition 
Security system SS is defined as a tuple of system elements 
definitions 
  , , , , , , , , ,SS L S O W U TP IPV ZG ZB SP= , (1) 
where: 
• L – sensitivity levels structure; 
• S – subjects set; 
• O – objects set; 
• W – layers set; 
• U – access rights structure; 
• TP – transformation procedures set; 
• IVP – integrity verification procedures set; 
• ZG – threats structure; 
• ZB – security measures structure; 
• SP – penetration paths set. 
Let PACC denote the sequence of acceptable security level 













The values are the maximum acceptable probability of beating 
each of the penetration paths. 0,1np   is considered  
a relative maximum acceptable probability of beating SPn, 
given SPn-1 as a reference point. np is a constant value, set 
based on system’s security requirements.  
The system is considered secure when 







 . (3) 
Function : 0,1P SP →  returns actual probabilities of  beating 
the penetration paths. [20] The function is defined in section 
V.K.  
B. Entity classes, entity categories and sensitivity levels 
structure definition 
Let C denote classes set. A linear order relation „≥” is 
specified on the classes set.  
Let K denote categories set. An inclusion relation „⊇” is 
specified on the set.  
The sensitivity levels structure L is defined as following: 
  ( , ) : ,L c k c C k K= =   . (4) 
A „domination” relation „≥” is specified on the structure 
 ( ) ( )i j i j i jc c k k      , 
 where ( , ) ( , )i i i j j jc k c k =  = . (5) 
The domination relation is a partial order relation. [4],[5] 
C. Subjects, objects and layers definition 
Let S denote subjects set, O - classes set and W layers set. 
The relation of “containing” layers within each other is 
denoted by „ ”. Layers set W is defined as follows: 
  1 2 3 4 5, , , ,W W W W W W= , (6) 
 
1 2 3 4 5W W W W W , where: (7) 
• W1 is the physical layer, including workstation; 
• W2 is the host operating system layer; 
• W3 is the virtual machines layer; 
• W4 is the virtual machines operating systems layer; 
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• W5 is the protected data layer. 
In the presented case the workstation and the operating system 
are considered layers, not objects.  
D. Objects to layers assignment 
The relation of object assignment to a layer is denoted by 
„⊇”. The subset of objects belonging to layer W is denoted 
wO : 
 ( )w
w W o O
o w o O
 
   . (8) 
Each object must be assigned to a layer 
⋃ 𝑂𝑤 ∈ 𝑂
𝑤∈𝑊
. (9) 




w v W w v
O O
 
 =  . [20] (10) 
E. Sensitivity levels to subjects and objects assignment  
For each subject two sensitivity levels are assigned – 
authorization level and current sensitivity level. Current 
sensitivity level cannot be dominate (in a relational sense) the 
authorization level. For each object there is one sensitivity 
level assigned. [5] 
F. Access rights structure definition 
Let UO denote access rights to objects set. 
   , , , ,OU r w a e g= , (11) 
where: 
• r – access right to read an object; 
• w – access right to write to an object (with automatic r right); 
• a – access right to append to an object (without r right); 
• e – access right to execute an object; 
• g – access right to grant access rights to the object. 
[4],[5],[11]  
 
Let UW denote access rights to layers set.  
   , , ,WU ew co ww gw= , (12) 
where:  
• ew – access right to enter the layer; 
• co – access right to create new object in a layer; 
• ww – access right to execute assigned object access rights; 
• gw – access right to grant access rights to the layer. 
 
Access right structure U is defined by two matrices, 
















G. Integrity verification and transformation procedures 
definition 
Let IVP integrity verification procedures set and TP – 
transformation procedures set. The sets’ elements are 
compatible with Clark-Wilson model rules. [8] 
The IVP and TP sets are split into subsets regarding the layer 





 ⋃ 𝐼𝑉𝑃𝑤 = 𝐼𝑉𝑃
𝑤∈𝑊
⋃ 𝑇𝑃𝑤 = 𝑇𝑃
𝑤∈𝑊
. (14) 
It is possible to distinguish three transformation procedures 
subsets: 
• “Internal” transformation procedures enabling the system 
state change within the same layer – 
( )I wTP . 
• “External” transformation procedures, enabling the system 
state change by transition to the “lower” layer - ( )E wTP .  
• “External” transformation procedures, enabling the system 
state change by transition to the “higher” layer -
( )E w
TP . 
 ( ) ( )( ) I w E w wE wTP TP TP TP  = . (15) 
H. State graph 
Let , , ss w O
St denote a state structure. , , ss w OSt is defined as 
tuple of the following elements: 
 ( ), , , ,, , , , , , , ,ss w O s s s w s w w w wSt s O w D TP IVP ZG ZB= , (16) 
where: 
• s is a subject currently working in the system; 
• s is the subject’s current sensitivity level; 
• sO  is a subset of active objects 
  : ( , )s o s OO o O u s o =      . (17) 
• w is a layer the subject is currently working in. 
• ,s wD is the substructure of access rights connected with the 
subject and the subset of active objects 
 ( ), : ( , ) ( , )
s
s w O W
o O
D u U u s o u u s w u

 
=     
 
 . (18) 
• ,s wTP is the subset of wTP associated with the subject – the 
set of transformation procedures the subject is allowed to 
execute in the layer determining the current state 
   ,s w wTP TP . (19) 
• 𝐼𝑉𝑃𝑤 is the subset of IVP associated with the layer the 
subject is currently in. 
• 𝑍𝐺𝑤 is the substructure of ZG associated with the layer the 
subject is currently in (cf. V.I) 
⋃ 𝑍𝐺𝑤 = 𝑍𝐺
𝑤∈𝑊
. (20) 
• 𝑍𝐵𝑤 is the substructure of ZB associated with the layer the 
subject is currently in (cf. V.J) 
⋃ 𝑍𝐵𝑤 = 𝑍𝐵
𝑤∈𝑊
. (21) 
Let sGS  denote the system’s state graph related to 
a particular subject. sGS is a directed graph with vertices set 





edges representing ,s wTP  defined subsets. Let sV  denote the 




s w O s
w W O O
St V
 
  . (22) 
Let sE denote the set of edges. Given the subject s S  
𝐸𝑠 = ⋃ 𝑇𝑃𝑠,𝑤
𝑤∈𝑊
. (23) 
Then sGS is an ordered triple  
 ( , , )s s sGS V E = , (24) 
where  
  2: ( , ) :s sE x y V x y →   . (25) 
I. Vulnerabilities and threats 
Given the state graph definition (Sec. V.H) it is possible to 
identify the system’s vulnerabilities as an occurrence of at least 
one of the following: 
• Access of a subject to any state defined in other subjects’ 
state graph. 
Let ,s s S , s s . Let \{ }S S s = . Then a state 
sSt GS  such that 
 :sSt GS St St =  (26) 
is considered an invalid state and therefore a vulnerability. 
• Unauthorized transition to a valid state. 
Let V and E denote vertices and edges (respectively) for each 
















Let   denote a function of transition between the system 
states 
 :V E V  → . (28) 
Let tp denote a transformation procedure such that 
 ( ),s wtp TP tp TP   . (29) 
Let ,s wV denote a set of vertices associated with subject s and 
layer w, as well as all the vertices associated with the subject 
s and layers adjacent to the layer w. If 
 
,, ' : ( , ) 's wv v V v tp v =  (30) 
then the tp procedure is considered an invalid transition 
factor and therefore a vulnerability. 
• Skip of the intermediate state when transitioning to a valid 
state. 
Let   be the function defined in (28). Let 𝑡𝑝1, 𝑡𝑝2 ∈ 𝑇𝑃 be  
valid transformation procedures. If there exists  
a transformation procedure 𝑡𝑝 such that 
 1 2, ' : ( ( , ), ) ( , ) 'v v V v tp tp v tp v   = = , (31) 
then the 𝑡𝑝 procedure is considered a vulnerability. 
• A valid state corruption. 
Let   be the function defined in (28). Let v V be a vertex 
with a set of integrity verification procedures vIVP . Let X 
denote the set defined as following: 
  ( , ) : , vX v ivp v V ivp IVP=   . (32) 
Let   denote a function of system state validation 
  : 0,1X → . (33) 
Suppose v  is a valid vertex 




= . (34) 
Let w V be a predecessor of v  and also a valid vertex. Let 
w vTP → be a set of transformation procedures transitioning 
system state from w  to v . If there exists a transformation 
procedure w vtp TP →  such that 
 ( )( ) ( ), , 0
vivp IVP
w tp v v ivp 

 
=  = 
 
 , (35) 
then the tp procedure is considered a vulnerability. 
• Transition to a corrupted state. 
Let   be the function defined in (33). Let   be the function 
defined in (28). For any vertex v V and any integrity 
verification procedure ivp IVP  assigned to the vertex, if 
there exists a transformation procedure tp such that 
 ( )( , ), 0v tp ivp  = , (36) 
then the tp procedure is considered a vulnerability. 
Based on identified vulnerabilities the threats set, denoted T, is 
constructed. Let ZG denote the threats structure (the ZG 
structure can be any data structure possible to be mapped to 
using T set). In the example, the structure is a matrix – 
constructed using Wzg function: 
 ( ): 0,1Wzg S W T  → . (37) 
Values of Wzg function should be considered as a measure of 
“consequences” resulting from executing a threat to a subject 
or a layer (in the example, the measure is a probability of 
executing a threat in the system). 
J. Security measures  
Let M denote security measures set – identified based on T. 
Let ZB denote the security measures structure (the ZB structure 
can be any data structure possible to be mapped to using M and 
T sets). The structure consists of two matrices – constructed 








zb S W M
zb M T




Values of Wzb function should be considered as a measure of 
“limitation of threats execution probability” resulting from 
applying a security measure to a subject or a layer. 
Values of Tzb function should be considered as a binary 
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indicator whether a threat’s probability of being executed is 
limited by a security measure. 
Having defined ZG and ZB structures, the merged structure, 
denoted ZBZG is constructed using 𝑧𝑔𝑧𝑏 function: 
𝑧𝑔𝑧𝑏: (𝑆 ∪𝑊) × 𝑇 → 〈0,1〉 (39) 
defined by 




𝑓(𝑒, 𝑡) = 𝑧𝑔𝑤(𝑒, 𝑡) − ∑ 𝑔(𝑒,𝑚, 𝑡)
𝑚∈𝑀




K. Penetration paths definition 
Let SP denote penetration paths set. The probability of 
beating penetration path nSP SP  is expressed by the 




( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 1






where ( )iP SP  is a probability of beating i-th penetration path 
and ( )jP W is a probability of penetrating j-th layer, expressed 







The methodology described in the paper represents generic 
approach towards defining security models for multi-layer 
systems. Models compatible with the methodology provide 
high level of data confidentiality and availability protection but 
lack strong mechanisms preventing integrity loss in “lower” 
layers of the systems – due to reversed entities’ integrity 
dependencies in security systems. As described in Sec. IV.D, it 
is strongly recommended to implement cryptographic integrity 
protection security measures and thoroughly identify system’s 
vulnerabilities connected with data integrity in order to 
implement sufficient integrity protection policies.    
The most important part in the methodology is the layer 
structure conception. Well-defined layers provide convenient 
recursive, defense-in-depth based security system definition. 
The recursion enables highly generic security system 
definitions, which may result in reducing models’ complexity. 
It is recommended that the models’ output is strictly connected 
with penetration paths definitions – directly bound to the 
defined layers structures. 
The presented idea of state graph as a representation of the 
data flow and user actions seems to be a sufficient basis for 








redundant in numerous examples of simply-configured 
systems. 
To summarize - all of the modelled system elements are 
represented by defined entities and structures in the model. 
Due to the above fact, it is claimed that the described 
methodology compatible models’ level of adequacy to the 
modelled systems is sufficient, which implies the  models may 
be used as a tool for measuring systems’ security level. 
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